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what services they do in fact need, 
price advertising can never give the 
public an accurate picture on which to 
base the selection of an attorney. In-
deed, in the context of legal services, 
such incompleted information could be 
worse than no information at all. It 
could be a trap for the unwary." 97 
S.Ct. at 2710. 
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Bates will have a far reaching 
effect on the professionals's relationship 
with those who need unique services. The 
consumer has now the opportunity to 
select an attorney based on the cost of the 
services provided. Now the question must 
be whether the legal profession will sup-
port or reject the Court's belief that dis-
semination of limited information, so long 
as it is accurate, is better than continued 
public ignorance and professional secrecy. 
Bates: 
A Local 
Response 
by Carol A. Robertson 
On June 27, 1977 the Supreme Court 
of the United States decided the case of 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 
2691 (1977), regarding legal advertising. 
Those who thought the controversy over 
advertising in the legal profession would 
be settled by this decision were very much 
mistaken. 
On July 8, 1977 the Annapolis law firm 
of LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, 
P.A. ran ad "A" in The Evening Capital. 
This so-called advertisement merely 
announced the addition of a new associate 
to the firm. Maryland is one ()f relatively 
few jurisdictions which still prohibits such 
announcements in newspapers. Despite 
Maryland's minority stance on announce-
ment type ads the members of the firm 
felt confident that their ad would be 
above reproach. They regarded the ad as 
entirely within the Bates decision on the 
theory that permitting advertisement of 
prices of routine legal services presumes 
advertisement of existence. Confident in 
their position, the young associates inno-
cently bantered among themselves of 
possible adverse Bar Association reaction. 
Imagine their consternation when they 
received a letter from the Attorney Grie-
vance Commission of Maryland instruct-
ing them that they were believed to be in 
violation of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and commanding them to 
cease and desist such action or suffer un-
told consequences. The Commission did 
not choose to enlighten the attorneys as 
to exactly how they were violating the 
Code. A formal grievance was not at that 
time filed. 
Legum, Cochran & Chartrand re-
sponded that they would not discontinue 
publication of their announcement and 
[A] 
LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, P.A. 
ANNOUNCE THAT 
MARTHA WYATT 
IS NOW ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRM 
IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
ALAN HILLIARD LEGUM 
GILL COCHRAN 
GEORGEJ.CHARTRAND 
208 DUKE OF GLOUCESTER ST. 
ANNAPOLIS, MD. 21401 
301 263-3001 
MARTHA WYATT 
[B] 
JULY 1, 1977 
LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, PA 
Attorneys at Law 
208 Duke of Gloucester Street 
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 
263-3001 
LEGAL SERVICES AT REASONABLE FEES 
Simple Uncomplicated Will (No Trust Provisions) ............ . 
Uncontested Divorce (No Dispute Concerning Grounds for Divorce) 
Simple Separation Agreement (Without Negotiation) ......... . 
Simple Power of Attorney .............................. . 
Preparation of Real Estate Sales Contract .................. . 
Preparation of Simple Deed ............................. . 
Brankruptcy Preceedings-Individual-
Nonbusiness, Uncontested 
Proceedings ...................................... . 
Change of Name (Uncontested) .......................... . 
Adoption (Uncontested) ................................ . 
$ 35.00 
250.00 
100.00 
25.00 
25.00 
15.00 
350.00 
75.00 
250.00 
The fee charges in other types of cases and in contested cases will depend on and 
vary according to the individual circumstances of that case. The above fees are in 
addition to court costs as assessed by the Clerk of Court. 
Hours: Monday, Wednesday and Friday-9 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
Tuesday and Thursday-9 a.m. to 7 p.m. 
Saturday-By appointment. 
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additionally that they anticipated future 
advertisements in compliance with the 
guidelines established by the Supreme 
Court. The announcement was published 
subsequent to the receipt of the Grievance 
Commission's letter. 
The next move belongs to the Grie-
vance Commission; but movement and 
comment have not been forthcoming. 
Stagnation is obviously not tolerated at 
LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, 
P.A. any more than is intimidation. On 
July 28 ad "B" appeared in The Evening 
Capital. 
The jury is still out on this noteworthy 
episode, but the verdict, no matter how 
slow in coming, seems certain; lawyer ad-
vertising has arrived. 
Medicaid 
Funds 
Aborted 
by Janis A. Riker 
As a result of two decisions by the 
Supreme Court permitting States to 
refuse to pay for non therapeutic abortions 
with Medicaid funds, A Brooklyn Federal 
District Court judge opened the doors for 
Congressional action to prohibit Medicaid 
payments for all abortions except those 
cases where the life of the mother would 
be in danger if the pregnancy were carried 
to term. 
In Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Ct. 236, (June 20, 
1977), and Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 
(June 20, 1977), the Supreme Court held 
that neither Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act nor the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires states partiCipating in the Medicaid 
program to spend Medicaid funds for non-
therapeutic abortions. 
Following these decisions regarding 
state action, the Supreme Court ordered 
the District Court judge to reconsider his 
previous injunction prohibiting enforce-
ment of the Hyde Amendment, which 
limits federal Medicaid funds for abortions 
to those in which the life of the mother is 
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in danger (Department of Labor and 
Health, Education and Welfare Ap-
propriation Act, 1977, sec. 209, Pub. L. 
No. 94-439 (1976)). As a result the in-
junction was withdrawn. The Hyde 
Amendment remained in effect only until 
September 30, 1977, but Congress is 
deadlocked in considering a continuation 
of its restrictions on abortion funding. 
Further Congressional action to limit 
federal payments for abortions would be 
necessary if Congress wants to prohibit 
states from using Medicaid funds. The 
Court held in Beal that Pennsylvania's 
refusal to provide Medicaid coverage for 
non therapeutic abortions is not inconsis-
tent with Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act, but that the statute does permit a 
state to provide such coverage if it so 
desires. The Hyde Amendment prohibited 
such coverage, however, for the current 
fiscal year. 
The 6-3 Beal decision (Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall and Blackmun dissenting) is 
based on the Court's interpretation of the 
language of the statute itself, the intent of 
Congress and the federal agency in-
terpretation of the statute. 
Quoting the statute's specific language, 
the Court concludes that the act confers 
broad discretion upon states to adopt 
standards for determining the extent of 
medical assistance provided. 
Noting that nontherapeutic abortions 
were unlawful in most states when Con-
gress passed Title XIX in 1965, Justice 
Powell said in the opinion that it was not 
likely that it was the intent of Congress to 
require states to fund nontherapeutic 
abortions. 
Furthermore, unless there are compell-
ing indications that the agency interpreta-
tion of the statute is erroneous, the Court 
will follow its construction, and the 
Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare concluded that Title XIX permits, 
but does not require, funding of non-
therapeutic abortions. 
In its companion Maher deCision, the 
Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution does not re-
quire a state partiCipating in Medicaid to 
pay for nontherapeutic abortions even 
though it pays for childbirth. It is this 
holding which provides the basis for 
federal legislation restricting abortion 
coverage by Medicaid funds. 
A regulation of the Connecticut 
Welfare Department limiting state 
Medicaid benefits for first trimester abor-
tions to those that are "medically necess-
ary" (a term defined to include psychiatric 
necessity) was challenged by two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain physi-
cians' certificates of medical necessity. 
A three-judge District Court panel en-
joined the state from requiring a certifi-
cate of medical necessity for Medicaid-
funded abortions, holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires a state to fund 
nontherapeutic abortions if it generally 
provides for funds for medical expenses 
related to pregnancy and childbirth. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding 
neither discrimination against a suspect 
class nor interference with a fundamental 
right protected by the Constitution. 
In its "strict scrutiny" analysis, the 
Court said that it has never held that fi-
nancial need alone creates a suspect class 
for equal protection purposes. 
Most importantly, the Court stated that 
the fundamental Constitutional right pro-
tected in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) was a woman's freedom to decide 
to terminate her pregnancy, not an un-
qualified right to the abortion itself. Roe 
prohibits undue state interference with a 
woman's decision to have an abortion, but 
it does not impose an affirmative obliga-
tion on states to make abortions available. 
Justice Brennan in his Maher dissent 
argues that the Connecticut statute in-
fringes on the woman's constitutionally 
protected right of privacy by placing fi-
nancial presssures on indigent women to 
carry their pregnancies to term. However, 
the six-justice majority concluded that 
Roe did not limit a state's authority to use 
